module ActionController::RequestForgeryProtection
Controller actions are protected from Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks by including a token in the rendered HTML for your application. This token is stored as a random string in the session, to which an attacker does not have access. When a request reaches your application, Rails verifies the received token with the token in the session. All requests are checked except GET requests as these should be idempotent. Keep in mind that all session-oriented requests are CSRF protected by default, including JavaScript and HTML requests.
Since HTML and JavaScript requests are typically made from the browser, we need to ensure to verify request authenticity for the web browser. We can use session-oriented authentication for these types of requests, by using the protect_from_forgery
method in our controllers.
GET requests are not protected since they don't have side effects like writing to the database and don't leak sensitive information. JavaScript requests are an exception: a third-party site can use a <script> tag to reference a JavaScript URL on your site. When your JavaScript response loads on their site, it executes. With carefully crafted JavaScript on their end, sensitive data in your JavaScript response may be extracted. To prevent this, only XmlHttpRequest (known as XHR or Ajax) requests are allowed to make requests for JavaScript responses.
Subclasses of ActionController::Base
are protected by default with the :exception
strategy, which raises an ActionController::InvalidAuthenticityToken
error on unverified requests.
APIs may want to disable this behavior since they are typically designed to be state-less: that is, the request API
client handles the session instead of Rails. One way to achieve this is to use the :null_session
strategy instead, which allows unverified requests to be handled, but with an empty session:
class ApplicationController < ActionController::Base protect_from_forgery with: :null_session end
Note that API
only applications don't include this module or a session middleware by default, and so don't require CSRF protection to be configured.
The token parameter is named authenticity_token
by default. The name and value of this token must be added to every layout that renders forms by including csrf_meta_tags
in the HTML head
.
Learn more about CSRF attacks and securing your application in the Ruby on Rails Security Guide.
Constants
- AUTHENTICITY_TOKEN_LENGTH
- NULL_ORIGIN_MESSAGE
Private Instance Methods
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 295 def any_authenticity_token_valid? # :doc: request_authenticity_tokens.any? do |token| valid_authenticity_token?(session, token) end end
Checks if any of the authenticity tokens from the request are valid.
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 381 def compare_with_global_token(token, session) # :doc: ActiveSupport::SecurityUtils.fixed_length_secure_compare(token, global_csrf_token(session)) end
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 377 def compare_with_real_token(token, session) # :doc: ActiveSupport::SecurityUtils.fixed_length_secure_compare(token, real_csrf_token(session)) end
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 415 def csrf_token_hmac(session, identifier) # :doc: OpenSSL::HMAC.digest( OpenSSL::Digest::SHA256.new, real_csrf_token(session), identifier ) end
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 435 def form_authenticity_param # :doc: params[request_forgery_protection_token] end
The form's authenticity parameter. Override to provide your own.
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 411 def global_csrf_token(session) # :doc: csrf_token_hmac(session, GLOBAL_CSRF_TOKEN_IDENTIFIER) end
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 242 def handle_unverified_request # :doc: forgery_protection_strategy.new(self).handle_unverified_request end
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 267 def mark_for_same_origin_verification! # :doc: @marked_for_same_origin_verification = request.get? end
GET requests are checked for cross-origin JavaScript after rendering.
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 273 def marked_for_same_origin_verification? # :doc: @marked_for_same_origin_verification ||= false end
If the verify_authenticity_token
before_action ran, verify that JavaScript responses are only served to same-origin GET requests.
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 370 def mask_token(raw_token) # :doc: one_time_pad = SecureRandom.random_bytes(AUTHENTICITY_TOKEN_LENGTH) encrypted_csrf_token = xor_byte_strings(one_time_pad, raw_token) masked_token = one_time_pad + encrypted_csrf_token encode_csrf_token(masked_token) end
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 314 def masked_authenticity_token(session, form_options: {}) # :doc: action, method = form_options.values_at(:action, :method) raw_token = if per_form_csrf_tokens && action && method action_path = normalize_action_path(action) per_form_csrf_token(session, action_path, method) else global_csrf_token(session) end mask_token(raw_token) end
Creates a masked version of the authenticity token that varies on each request. The masking is used to mitigate SSL attacks like BREACH.
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 278 def non_xhr_javascript_response? # :doc: %r(\A(?:text|application)/javascript).match?(media_type) && !request.xhr? end
Check for cross-origin JavaScript responses.
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 465 def normalize_action_path(action_path) # :doc: uri = URI.parse(action_path) uri.path.chomp("/") end
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 404 def per_form_csrf_token(session, action_path, method) # :doc: csrf_token_hmac(session, [action_path, method.downcase].join("#")) end
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 440 def protect_against_forgery? # :doc: allow_forgery_protection end
Checks if the controller allows forgery protection.
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 399 def real_csrf_token(session) # :doc: session[:_csrf_token] ||= generate_csrf_token decode_csrf_token(session[:_csrf_token]) end
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 302 def request_authenticity_tokens # :doc: [form_authenticity_param, request.x_csrf_token] end
Possible authenticity tokens sent in the request.
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 362 def unmask_token(masked_token) # :doc: # Split the token into the one-time pad and the encrypted # value and decrypt it. one_time_pad = masked_token[0...AUTHENTICITY_TOKEN_LENGTH] encrypted_csrf_token = masked_token[AUTHENTICITY_TOKEN_LENGTH..-1] xor_byte_strings(one_time_pad, encrypted_csrf_token) end
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 330 def valid_authenticity_token?(session, encoded_masked_token) # :doc: if encoded_masked_token.nil? || encoded_masked_token.empty? || !encoded_masked_token.is_a?(String) return false end begin masked_token = decode_csrf_token(encoded_masked_token) rescue ArgumentError # encoded_masked_token is invalid Base64 return false end # See if it's actually a masked token or not. In order to # deploy this code, we should be able to handle any unmasked # tokens that we've issued without error. if masked_token.length == AUTHENTICITY_TOKEN_LENGTH # This is actually an unmasked token. This is expected if # you have just upgraded to masked tokens, but should stop # happening shortly after installing this gem. compare_with_real_token masked_token, session elsif masked_token.length == AUTHENTICITY_TOKEN_LENGTH * 2 csrf_token = unmask_token(masked_token) compare_with_global_token(csrf_token, session) || compare_with_real_token(csrf_token, session) || valid_per_form_csrf_token?(csrf_token, session) else false # Token is malformed. end end
Checks the client's masked token to see if it matches the session token. Essentially the inverse of masked_authenticity_token
.
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 385 def valid_per_form_csrf_token?(token, session) # :doc: if per_form_csrf_tokens correct_token = per_form_csrf_token( session, request.path.chomp("/"), request.request_method ) ActiveSupport::SecurityUtils.fixed_length_secure_compare(token, correct_token) else false end end
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 455 def valid_request_origin? # :doc: if forgery_protection_origin_check # We accept blank origin headers because some user agents don't send it. raise InvalidAuthenticityToken, NULL_ORIGIN_MESSAGE if request.origin == "null" request.origin.nil? || request.origin == request.base_url else true end end
Checks if the request originated from the same origin by looking at the Origin header.
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 289 def verified_request? # :doc: !protect_against_forgery? || request.get? || request.head? || (valid_request_origin? && any_authenticity_token_valid?) end
Returns true or false if a request is verified. Checks:
-
Is it a GET or HEAD request? GETs should be safe and idempotent
-
Does the form_authenticity_token match the given token value from the params?
-
Does the X-CSRF-Token header match the form_authenticity_token?
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 227 def verify_authenticity_token # :doc: mark_for_same_origin_verification! if !verified_request? if logger && log_warning_on_csrf_failure if valid_request_origin? logger.warn "Can't verify CSRF token authenticity." else logger.warn "HTTP Origin header (#{request.origin}) didn't match request.base_url (#{request.base_url})" end end handle_unverified_request end end
The actual before_action that is used to verify the CSRF token. Don't override this directly. Provide your own forgery protection strategy instead. If you override, you'll disable same-origin <script>
verification.
Lean on the protect_from_forgery declaration to mark which actions are due for same-origin request verification. If protect_from_forgery is enabled on an action, this before_action flags its after_action to verify that JavaScript responses are for XHR requests, ensuring they follow the browser's same-origin policy.
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 257 def verify_same_origin_request # :doc: if marked_for_same_origin_verification? && non_xhr_javascript_response? if logger && log_warning_on_csrf_failure logger.warn CROSS_ORIGIN_JAVASCRIPT_WARNING end raise ActionController::InvalidCrossOriginRequest, CROSS_ORIGIN_JAVASCRIPT_WARNING end end
If verify_authenticity_token
was run (indicating that we have forgery protection enabled for this request) then also verify that we aren't serving an unauthorized cross-origin response.
# File actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb, line 423 def xor_byte_strings(s1, s2) # :doc: s2 = s2.dup size = s1.bytesize i = 0 while i < size s2.setbyte(i, s1.getbyte(i) ^ s2.getbyte(i)) i += 1 end s2 end
© 2004–2020 David Heinemeier Hansson
Licensed under the MIT License.